Although the classical 20th-century music snob still endures vestigially, the species peaked with Gen X before breathing its dying gasps through Elder Millennials and ‘00s hipsterdom, at which point poptimism and the internet’s democratizing forces finally crushed the phenomenon for good (Pitchfork not only helped euthanize it but provided the movement’s palliative care during its twilight years). The archetypal snobs were deeply flawed characters like the High Fidelity record store clerks and the Comic Book Guy in The Simpsons (always retail employees, seemingly, whose empowerment as gatekeepers shared the same trajectory as brick-and-mortar media distribution). The snobs’ core competency, which also dates the onset of their extinction, was the act of codifying and internalizing canonical taste—a vocation that ultimately amounted to an act of memorization. At the height of their prowess, pre-internet cultural elitists tapped into veins of esoteric knowledge via subcultural infrastructure that the mainstream could not or would not access, and then imprinted that knowledge upon themselves thoroughly enough that they could reliably transmit it to others. In this milieu, where good taste itself was always being formalized and even centralized (and thus not always open to interpretation), you distinguished yourself from the masses not by deciding what was good, but by having better access to the sources of taste and then merging them into your own identity, thereby becoming a beacon for others to follow.
Like the printing press in the 15th century, the internet would rapidly devalue a variety of hard-won skills, and analog snobs would suffer the same fate that monastic scribes once did. As the ‘00s progressed, it became clear that internalizing information—memorizing, cataloging, recognizing—was precisely what we would no longer need to do. Memory was outsourced to the cloud as taste became the individual’s burden: We all found ourselves adrift on an unbounded sea of content, suddenly responsible for doing our own canonization. The task was so overwhelming that one could hardly be blamed for poptimistically clinging to Justin Timberlake and Kelly Clarkson as life rafts. At the same time, the work of actively remembering the past began to attentuate. Marshall McLuhan wrote that every new technology was an extension of the human body but also an amputation of the same function from the body itself, and computers’ ability to furnish us with a second brain implies that our first brains have correspondingly atrophied. The recent resurgence of Kate Bush’s “Running Up That Hill,” sparked by its placement in Stranger Things, should not have been too surprising (and maybe it wasn’t) but its particular resonance probably derives from the song’s status as “a shibboleth of good taste in music,” as Foster Kamer wrote. Kate Bush is a bridge connecting the old world—where shibboleths of good taste mattered—to the new world where we wake up as clean slates each morning, primed for algorithmic feeds and streaming platforms’ curation to reprogram us anew. Amnesiac TikTokers have no choice but to proclaim everything a trend because the past is more of a mystery than the future. Who cares if you knew about Kate Bush before someone else did? The clock just reset to zero again. We are all constantly starting from scratch now, and if you actually remember the past, your curse is to get annoyed when others naively unearth it.
Time is the new space. The digital annihilation of physical distance means that culture must be organized temporally. Social media feeds’ transition from chronological to algorithmic sorting was a manipulation of time comparable to the railroad’s manipulation of space—relevance, as determined by someone else, now outweighs recency as a criterion for occupying valuable real estate in your attention field. But recency is still one of the variables in the formula and if two posts are equally “relevant” the freshest one will get priority. The corollary here is that all information, however significant, must eventually be pushed aside to make room for the new, although it may stick around slightly longer. Without the monkish music elitists preserving our memories of what they deem canonical, Kate Bush must disappear until some extrinsic force like Netflix resurrects her. Formerly, space fulfilled a similar role, as Robin Sloan illustrates by describing social media as an orthographic projection: Before electronic media, Sloan writes, news was filtered by spatial distance. “When it arrived on your doorstep, a report of a far-off event had an ‘amplitude’ that helped you judge whether or not it mattered to you and/or the world…That’s not the case with social media, where even tiny, distant events are reproduced ‘at full size’ on your screen.” Such news may be full size but it fades quickly; without the spatial filtering of culture, time is the only source of amplitude. Counterintuitively, this ensures that the past keeps recirculating, always presenting itself as new.
This newsletter is supported by paid subscriptions, which give you access to an extra issue (in addition to the free Friday issue). Sign up to get the full experience.
Reads:
Ian Bogost on why remote work is not the future: The inefficiency of the office is the point. “Return-to-office plans are not concerned, in any fundamental way, with workers and their plight or preferences. Rather they serve as affirmations of a superseding value.”
LM Sacasas on the collapse of shared knowledge mediated by institutions and the rise of virtually-shared “bespoke realities.”
The people who are finding God through Bitcoin. “The more Tomer Strolight…learned about Bitcoin, the more he became convinced that the world’s first cryptocurrency was not solely the work of man.”
In music-snobdom at least, one thing that has been lost is the sense of community. Previously two music lovers - ahem, snobs - could unite around their shared sense of good taste; now, with everything churned and resurfaced by the algorithm, a listener cannot be certain that the music they like is even worth talking about to anyone else, and loneliness is the reward of admiration and enjoyment of a piece of music. Of course, a snob might not be able to find another person who also was a snob in the same way, but at least the awareness of a canon of taste meant that the snob had the potential for finding community with other snobs. This has been lost.
I would date the decline of the snob a little earlier than you do, perhaps starting in the 1960s with the divide between classical music snobs and devotees of Jazz. Theodore Gracyk's "Rhythm and Noise" has an excellent chapter on this division, in which he discusses Theodore Adorno's displeasure at Jazz lovers and especially (gasp!) those who enjoy rock. As the century progressed, with punk, new wave, and goth subcultures fabricating alterna-canons of snobbery, the hold which classical music had on the culture at large was wiped away, priming the internet era for the temporal and spatial obfuscation that you describe.
FWIW, I've been listening to the Terry Riley album mentioned in your title since I was about fifteen years old. I'm an older millennial, and was at one time one of the last of the music snobs.
The ideal "music snob" today is less Comic Book Guy (and/or Rob Gordon) and more your friend's cool older brother; home from college, and stoked that you're interested in what they're listening to.
Algorithms might be fascinating-I think so, anyway- but there's no magic in my showing you the playlist on my phone screen.